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Abstract
It is generally agreed that the funding base for German universities is inadequate and
perhaps the time has come for serious consideration of the imposition of non-trivial
tuition charges. This paper compares conventional and income contingent loans for
financing tuition fees at German universities. Two aspects are considered: the size
of repayment burdens associated with mortgage-style loans, and the time structure of
revenue to the government from a hypothetical income contingent loan. We find that
tuition fees could increase considerably with the use of an income contingent loan sys-
tem similar to policy approaches used in Australia, England and New Zealand.
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1 Introduction
Despite the high demand for qualified people in the German economy, total spending on
tertiary education in Germany is below the OECD average (OECD, 2010). Although
the German government recognises the need for larger investments in higher education of
young generations, the financial scope in the presence of unprecedented public debt and
declining tax revenue is rather small. In response several German states have introduced
tuition fees of up to e500 per semester since summer 2007 to cover a small fraction of
the annual cost of about e7,000 per student; publicly owned banks have started to offer
student loans to finance these fees.1
The pressures to introduce or increase tuition fees are apparently inexorable and shared
with many other countries. This is evidenced in the UK for example, with the history
of debate concerning the role and introduction of income contingent loans (ICLs) for
tuition2 and from controversial tuition fee increases for English universities that are in
effect as of 2012/2013 academic year. A critical point for policy is that it is well known in
a context of less-than trivial enrolment costs that student loan systems are essential for
both efficiency and equity reasons.3 It is a context in which significant increases in tuition
charges are inevitable for Germany that motivates the discussion following concerning
types and implications of expanded student loan schemes.
In this paper we analyse two different aspects of alternative student loan policies in
a German context, which are: a normal “mortgage-style” system, such as those used in
the US and Canada; and, an alternative approach to using ICLs for financing tuition fees,
similar to Australia’s Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS) and the student
loan systems of England and New Zealand. We illustrate salient issues for both schemes
in the case in which annual tuition fees at German universities increase to e3,500 per
1According to the Federal Statistical Office (2008), the average annual public expenditure on tertiary
education per student in 2005 was e7,180.
2See Barr (1993), Chapman (1997) and Greenaway and Hayes (2003).
3See Friedman (1962) and Chapman (2006).
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student to cover about 50 percent of the total cost.4
Our analysis focuses on two important elements of the student loan debate: the likely
“repayment burdens” (the share of a person’s income that is needed to service a debt)
associated with a typical loan, and the time structure of repayments of an alternative
approach, an ICL. These exercises are described in detail below, and they allow us to
draw inferences about the efficacy for Germany of alternative tuition loan schemes. The
paper can be usefully understood as an empirical exercise designed to highlight critical
aspects of student loan design for German higher education reform.
Both features of the analysis require recent data concerning graduates’ projected life-
time incomes and to this end we utilise the German Microcensus 2008, which includes
a large representative sample of university graduates. It is necessary to estimate age-
income profiles in a disaggregated way to allow insights into the underlying importance
of graduate income distributions by age. Consequentially we use unconditional quantile
regression models for four demographic groups, differentiating between men and women
residing in East and West Germany.
The empirical findings highlight some potentially significant problems associated with
repayment difficulties in the application of a mortgage-type loan (ML) system to assist
in the financing of the imposition of tuition to German universities. We find also that
a hypothetical ICL system for Germany has significant elements of financial feasibility
and seems to be workable in terms of repayment periods, even for most of the lowest in-
come graduates. This suggests that the imposition of tuition fees at levels commensurate
with those of other countries, paid through an ICL, could be made to deliver consider-
able revenue for the government without disrupting the access of prospective university
students.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets the scene through a description of
some of the movements towards student loans in contemporary Germany and outlines
relevant aspects of institutional conditions in the German context. Conceptual issues
concerning the design of loan systems are considered in Section 3. Section 4 describes our
empirical strategy and the data. Projected repayment burdens with respect to an ML
4This amount is comparable to the current maximum tuition fee of £3,290 (about e4,000) for the
2010/2011 academic year in the UK, and similar to tuition levels in Australia, Canada and New Zealand.
2
are presented in Section 5. Section 6 examines the repayment structures associated with
a hypothetical ICL system similar to those currently in operation in Australia, England
and New Zealand.
2 Current Institutional Arrangements of German Stu-
dent Loan Systems
In 2009/2010, around 250,000 students began study at one of the 110 universities in
Germany. Less than 11,000 students currently attend one of the 10 private universities,
while the total number of students at German universities is about 1.4 million. About 11
percent of the students at German institutions of higher education are foreign-born.5
Given that German universities had previously been free for all students (except for
a lump-sum fee for administrative and other purposes), loan schemes have been designed
only for the funding of student’s living expenses.6 However, since summer 2007 tuition
fees of up to e500 per semester were introduced in the following seven states: Baden-
Wu¨rttemberg, Bavaria, Hamburg, Hesse, Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia and
Saarland. While these reforms have been reversed in some states within a short period
as a result of political disquiet, there have also been concomitant institutional changes
designed to assist students in financing their tuition.
Specifically, as a result of the introduction of tuition fees, some publicly owned banks
have started to offer student loans to cover these fees, and Table 1 provides an overview
of loan conditions.7 Typically all students are eligible for a loan if general tuition fees are
collected in their state, but there are maximum age limits in all states varying between 35
years in Lower Saxony and 60 years in North Rhine-Westphalia. In addition, students
may only receive a loan for up to 2 years after their regular period of study (which depends
5Both the Federal Statistical Office (http://www.destatis.de) and the association of universities and
other higher education institutions (Hochschulrektorenkonferenz, http://www.hochschulkompass.de) reg-
ularly publish the most recent student and university numbers on their websites.
6The Federal Training Assistance Act (Bundesausbildungsfo¨rderungsgesetz or BAfo¨G) that regulates
student loans for financing living expenses focuses on students from low-income households. The eligibility
for these student loans typically depends on the parents’ income. A more detailed discussion of these
loans is beyond the scope of this paper.
7Detailed information about public loans for financing tuition fees at German universities is provided
on http://www.studis-online.de and http://www.bafoeg-aktuell.de.
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on study field).
< Table 1 about here >
With the systems noted above loan repayments typically start after the end of a
deferment period, which lasts between 1.5 and 2 years, and monthly repayment lies be-
tween e20 and e150. Interest rate charges also vary considerably across states and there
are some upper debt limits (the maximum amount that has to be repaid), reported in
Table 1. Since this debt limit may also include loans that were provided for financing
living expenses, former students who have received a sufficiently high loan for their living
expenses do not have to repay the loan they received to cover tuition fees.
This discussion highlights two critical aspects of current approaches to student fi-
nancing in Germany. These are that currently: (a) there are disparate student loan
schemes across Germany; and (b) the arrangements in place are insufficiently large or
comprehensive to accommodate the major expansion in student financing which would
be necessitated in a context of radical changes in tuition charges. A case can be made for
institutional changes and this highlights the need for a detailed consideration of student
loan scheme alternatives.
3 The Essential Difference between ML and ICL: Re-
payment Burdens
3.1 Introduction: Student Loan Schemes as Government Inter-
vention
One of the areas of consensus in the economics of education literature is that capital
market failure in the financing of human capital investments requires government inter-
vention in the form of the provision of student loans, a point first raised in Friedman
(1962). The essential issues are threefold: (1) investment in higher education is a costly
process for individuals, involving foregone income and (usually) tuition charges; (2) the
private financial returns to educational investments are very uncertain; and, (3) in the
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absence of a guarantor, banks offering loans to students face major default risks because
students lack saleable collateral.8
The process then involves the classic problem of a market failure, the consensus being
that without some sort of intervention higher education outcomes will not be propitious.
Prospective students judged by the commercial sector to be relatively risky (for example,
those without loan repayment guarantors), will not be able to access the financial resources
to cover income support and/or for the payment of tuition. It is reasonable to suggest that
without intervention in the form of student loans there would be efficiency losses (talented
but financially disadvantaged prospective students would be excluded), and distributional
inequities (the non-attainment of equality of educational opportunity). Given the need
for a student loan system the obvious next set of issues relates to the costs and benefits
of disparate approaches, and these are now considered.
3.2 Distinctions between ML and ICL
There are two different student loan policy approaches noted in the Introduction and con-
sidered in depth in the literature.9 Until recently, government intervention internationally
mainly took the form of public sector guarantees for commercial bank (or government)
provision of education loans, with repayments made on the basis of set time periods. This
is typically the way loans work for mortgages for the financing of housing, which explains
why they are given the label ML. Such approaches are currently used in the US, Canada
and Thailand, for example.
The other student loan system is one in which repayments depend on borrowers’
future incomes, which is why they are referred to as income contingent. ICLs are typically
collected through the income tax system, and since this type of scheme began in Australia
in 1989, several other countries have adopted ICLs.10 Further, ICLs have been, or are
currently under discussion, in Ireland, Chile, Ethiopia, Colombia, Scotland, the European
Union and Malaysia.
8For a full discussion of the areas of uncertainty see Barr (2001), Palacios (2004) and Chapman (2006).
9See Chapman (2006).
10These include New Zealand (1992), England (1997), Ethiopia (2002), Hungary (2003) and Thailand
(2006, for one year only).
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The critical distinction between ML and ICL in terms of the effectiveness and equity
of higher education financing systems relates not to the source of the initial finances, but
to the way in which student loan obligations are collected. This is all traceable to the
role of “repayment burdens”, now explained.
Education economists have examined the concept and implications of student loan
repayment burdens for more than a quarter of a century.11 Defined simply, the repayment
burden is the proportion of a person’s disposable income that needs to be allocated to
service a debt per period, or formally:
Repayment burden in period t =
Loan repayment in period t
Income in period t
. (1)
The important distinction between ML and ICL in the repayment burdens context
is that student loan repayments for an ML are constant over a set time period, while
student loan repayments for an ICL depend on future incomes and thus not on time. This
means that student borrowers in an ML scheme are required to have repaid their loans
after a certain pre-ordained period,12 but for those with ICL loan repayments instead
are obligated to repay their debts contingent on their individual future circumstances.
In other words, the numerator of equation (1) is fixed for an ML, meaning that the
repayment burden must differ between student borrowers because their future incomes
will follow unique paths.
On the other hand, for an ICL the repayment burden is set by the rules of the loan
system,13 which has the consequence that each borrower faces a unique time period of loan
repayments over time. It follows that borrowers in ICL systems face unique lengths of
loan repayments. In the Australian experience, for example, a small minority of borrowers
will have paid off their debt less than two years after graduation and around 15 percent
will never repay their debts in full.
The reason that these distinctions matter in an assessment of the consequences for
both the efficacy and distributional effects of ML and ICL is now explained.
11See Woodhall (1987), Ziderman (1999), Schwartz and Finnie (2002), Salmi (2003) and Baum and
Schwartz (2006).
12For example, 10 years is the typical repayment period for US Stafford loans Chapman and Lounkaew
(2010a).
13For example, in Australia in 2011 no repayments are required until the borrower’s income reaches
around $(A)47,000 per annum after which 4 to 8 percent of income is collected for debt repayment,
depending on the borrower’s income.
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3.3 The Importance of Repayment Burdens
In a repayment burden context there are two concerns commonly raised with respect to
MLs. The first is that in situations in which repayment burdens become high for debtors,
the prospect of default emerges. A borrower who defaults is likely to experience signifi-
cant damage with respect to their credit reputation (and thus access to future borrowing,
for example, for the purchase of a house). Significantly, it is clear that repayment bur-
dens really matter as a loan default factor, with research suggesting that defaulters are
predominantly those experiencing relatively high unemployment rates and relatively low
earnings.14 The findings of Dynarski (1994) and Gross et al. (2009) substantiate that
student loan defaulters in the US are much more likely to have low levels of income.
The consequence of a student defaulting on an ML loan obligation is a potentially crit-
ical issue for the willingness of prospective students to borrow because of the uncertainties
associated with the returns to human capital investments.15 A consequence is that some
eligible prospective students will not be prepared to take bank loans, and this implies
that MLs are unable to fully solve the problem of underinvestment in human capital.
The point was recognized in Friedman (1962), who promoted a form of human capital
contract16 or equity scheme for investment in human capital.
The second, and arguably more important problem for students with MLs relates also
to repayment burdens, and concerns possible consumption hardship associated with loan
repayments that do not take into account capacity to repay loans. This means essentially
that in a situation in which borrowers experience unexpectedly low incomes their dis-
posable incomes are reduced further through having to meet ML repayment obligations.
This suggests that an experience of unemployment, part-time work, or poor employment
outcomes will be associated with financial difficulties, again because loan repayment re-
quirements are constant according to time. Recent research has shown that for graduates
with very low incomes repayment burdens associated with MLs can be as high as 75 per-
14Dynarski (1994) used the National Post-secondary Student Aid Study and found strong evidence that
experiencing low earnings after leaving formal education is a strong determinant of default. Importantly,
borrowers from low-income households, and minorities, were more likely to default, as were those who
did not complete their studies.
15These uncertainties are considered fully in Barr (2001) and Chapman (2006).
16Palacios (2004) analyses in full this type of approach to student financing.
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cent in Thailand and 60 percent in the US.17 It is entirely plausible that these experiences
lead to considerable consumption hardships for borrowers in these situations.
Both of these concerns are addressed with an ICL because loan obligations take into
account the borrower’s future capacity to repay.18 First, there is no default issue related to
a borrower experiencing a low income, because the repayment burden of an ICL explicitly
takes this into account. Second, and again as result of repayments being contingent on
income, there will be no concerns by students with respect to hardships associated with
repayments so long as the collection parameters are sensibly designed. This is the critical
practical advantage of ICL; they offer insurance against both default and consumption
hardship that cannot be achieved with an ML.
3.4 Repayment Burdens: How Big is too Big?
Do we know what proportion of a debtor’s income repayment burdens need to be limited
to? A definition of what this means in practice is illusory, with the most comprehensive
analysis being Baum and Schwartz (2006), which refers to the so-called “8 percent rule”,
a standard suggesting that “... students should not devote more than 8 percent of their
gross income to repayment of student loans.” (page 2). Their paper quotes an extensive
literature in support, albeit recognizing a fairly large range in suggested boundaries.
This is a complicated issue since it involves assessments about both the welfare diffi-
culties experienced and the probabilities that higher repayment burdens must affect the
likelihood of loan defaulting, with longer-term costs for both debtors and taxpayers. As
well, it seems implausible to suggest that there is a given proportion of income that should
be used as a cut-off, which is independent of the level of incomes, particularly in a context
in which there are such wide income disparities between graduates of different countries.
Even so, a rough rule of thumb might be useful and can be applied cautiously to the
results revealed below for Germany.
17See Chapman et al. (2010) for the Thai calculations and Chapman and Lounkaew (2010a) for the
US analysis.
18The default insurance and consumption smoothing aspects of ICL are addressed convincingly in a
theoretical context in Quiggin (2003).
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4 Estimating Repayment Burdens for a German Stu-
dent Loans System
4.1 A Hypothetical Loans Scheme Described
In our empirical analysis of potential repayment burdens with respect to an ML scheme
we require two separate pieces of information, which are estimates of the numerator and
denominator of Equation (1). The numerator is given by the loan repayment figure per
year, which applies from an assumed level of borrowing for tuition in combination with
an assumed repayment period and a real rate of interest. For illustrative purposes we
propose a hypothetical loan characterised by the following dimensions:
(a) A total debt of e17,500, which comes as a result of a student undertaking a five-year
degree with tuition charges of e3,500 per full-time year per annum;
(b) a ten year repayment period for the debt, with repayments beginning two years after
graduation;
(c) graduation occurs at age 26 and thus repayments begin at age 28;
(d) a real interest rate on the debt of 3 percent per annum,19 which applies at the time
of disbursement of the monies, assumed to be at the beginning at each year of study;
and
(e) two repayment scenarios: a 10-year and a 15-year period of repayment.
To derive a structure of expected repayment burdens for a typical student/graduate, we
need also to construct a hypothetical education/work experience and this relies on the
following assumptions:
(a) Students enrol in higher education for the first time at age 21;20
19That is, CPI inflation plus 3 percent. This is about what is charged with Stafford Loans in the US
(Chapman and Lounkaew, 2010a).
20In this scenario we assume that high school is completed at age 19, followed by a year of military or
civil service.
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(b) the degree takes five years and the student is assumed to complete the course in the
minimum time; and
(c) graduates enter the labour force immediately after completing the degree, at age 26.
Figures 1 and 2 show the expected repayments for the hypothetical debtor, and the
amounts at each age become the numerator of Equation (1). The amounts in real terms
are assumed to decline by 2 percent per annum, reflecting our assumption of expected
German annual CPI increases.21
< Figures 1 and 2 about here >
4.2 Measuring Expected Incomes in Calculations of Repayment
Burdens
The denominator of Equation (1), the per-period income received by student loan debtors,
is critical to the exercise. An important point is that until recently significant research
has used very aggregate proxies of incomes, such as that received on average by graduates.
Ziderman (2003), for example, in an analysis of the repayment burdens associated with
the Thai Student Loan Fund, compared debt-servicing obligations to the earnings of
graduates using average Thai graduate earnings by age and sex.
From this Ziderman (2003) concludes that “The annual repayment burden in terms of
annual income is very light, in the region of only 2-4 percent annually” (p. 83), and adds
that “... the Thai student loan scheme is overly generous ... which may be effortlessly
repaid out of higher income received on courses of schooling.” (p. 83). However, beyond
average graduates earnings there are wide dispersions of income received by graduates.22
Like many issues in economics, some of the most interesting empirical aspects concern
the tails of the distribution.
21This figure is about the average inflation rate for the period after the German reunification
(http://www.destatis.de).
22This fact is highlighted by the relatively low explanatory power for OLS earnings functions models.
For example, Chapman and Lounkaew (2010b) found an R-squared of around 0.4 for Thai earnings
functions: a plethora of other earnings function studies typically explain no more than 20-30 percent of
the variance.
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Chapman et al. (2010) analyse earnings distributions by age of Thai graduates and find
that repayment burdens differ by extraordinarily high amounts; the range is between 1
percent for the top 25 percent of earners and 70 percent for the bottom 10 percent of
earners. Chapman and Lounkaew (2010a) repeat these exercises for the US and also find
a very large range of burdens across the earnings distribution in that country. These are
significant findings for what follows.
4.3 The Income Data
For calculations of the denominator of Equation (1) we use data from the German Micro-
census 2008, an annual representative cross-sectional survey of 1 percent of all German
households, collected by the German Federal Statistical Office. The data set includes
information concerning the economic and social situation of individuals and households,
and includes, among other things, information on sex, education, age, income, and em-
ployment status.
The Microcensus constitutes an excellent data source for the purpose of our analysis,
because it includes a large sample of university graduates and allows the construction of
all relevant variables. However, due to the design of the survey and the questionnaire,
assumptions have to be made to determine the income variables that are needed for the
empirical analysis. Specifically, information about the monthly net income of employed
individuals is used to generate two relevant income measures: “annual net income” and
“annual gross income”. We employ the net income measure to calculate repayment bur-
dens and use gross incomes to estimate the age-income profiles described in the following
subsection.
We use the self-reported monthly net income from all income sources (including wages
and salaries, bonus payments, business income, unemployment and social benefits, child
allowance, interest income, etc.) to calculate annual net income. Monthly gross income is
obtained by using an online income tax calculator for the year 2008.23 We define annual
gross income as 12 times the monthly gross income. The Microcensus further includes
23See http://www.parmentier.de/steuer/incometax.htm. Monthly gross income is calculated separately
for single and married households with and without children.
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information concerning the year in which the highest degree was obtained and this allows
us to calculate the years of potential labour market experience for each individual.
We restrict our sample to university graduates with German citizenship between 26
and 65 years of age, and we have excluded persons who are either self-employed, in
education, in the military/civil service, or recorded as having zero income even though
they are employed. After dropping all observations with missing values on one of the
relevant variables, our sample includes 6,634 male and 6,293 female graduates residing
in West Germany and 1,946 male and 2,052 female graduates in East Germany. Of
these, 5,941 male and 5,412 female graduates in West Germany as well as 1,608 male
and 1,693 female graduates in East Germany are employed. Table 2 contains summary
statistics for the sample of both employed and not employed individuals.24
< Table 2 about here >
The numbers do not only reveal sizeable differences between men and women, but
also between West and East Germany, reflecting that differences in the labour markets
of the two regions persist two decades after the German reunification. Other points of
interest are that: the average income of male graduates in West Germany is much higher
than that of male graduates in East Germany; while female graduates earn less than male
graduates, the income differential between female graduates in West and East Germany
is quite small; female labour force participation among graduates is 86.4 percent in West
Germany, compared to 82.5 percent in East Germany; and the employment rate among
male graduates is 89.7 percent in West Germany and 82.9 percent in East Germany.
Overall, these data highlight considerable differences between men and women in the two
regions, which explains why we have chosen to perform our empirical analysis separately
for the four groups.25
24The labour force status of debtors is irrelevant in our calculation of repayment burdens since debts
are owed on the basis of time.
25In order to check the accuracy of our income measures, we have reproduced our empirical analysis for
a pooled sample of the four groups and compared the results to those of a similar analysis based on data
from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). Due to the small sample size of the GSOEP, we have
pooled the years 2007-2009 instead of using a single cross-section. The empirical results obtained from
the two data sources are very similar, indicating that the income measures employed in our empirical
analysis are quite accurate.
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4.4 Predicted Income Functions
In order to calculate the repayment flow of an ICL, we estimate the age-income profile
for each subgroup by employing a standard income regression model, which includes a
quadratic function of potential labour market experience. We are particularly interested
in the age-income profile of graduates who are at least 28 years old because we assume
that individuals typically graduate at age 26 and that loan repayment begins after the
end of a 2-year deferment period. We use the estimates of the potential labour market
experience to predict incomes, taking into account that a typical 28-year old university
graduate will have 2 years of potential labour market experience.26
A methodological problem arises from the nonlinear nature of the dependent variable
because income is measured in brackets rather than on a continuous scale. For that
reason, interval regressions represent the most appropriate way of estimating our income
functions. However, the interval regression model inhibits distributional analyses because
it may only be used to estimate mean effects of the regressors on the dependent variable.
Fortunately, the number of income brackets is sufficiently large (there are 24 categories)
to justify the use of mean points and to estimate linear rather than interval regression
models.27 Specifically, we estimate a regression model of the following form:
y = α + β1exp+ β2exp
2 + ε. (2)
where y is our income measure and exp denotes potential labour market experience in
years.28 Since the profiles may differ considerably across the income distribution, we ex-
tend our calculation of profiles beyond the mean. This is a critical aspect of our exer-
cise, because it allows the calculation of a large number and range of repayment bur-
dens for individuals predicted to be significantly different to the mean. To estimate
age-income profiles at particular quantiles of the distribution we employ unconditional
quantile regressions based on so-called “re-centered influence functions” (Firpo et al.,
26Alternative approaches have been discussed in the literature (Geweke and Keane, 2000; Moffitt and
Gottschalk, 2002; Meghir and Pistaferri, 2004; Heckman et al., 2006) and their implications for the design
of student loans remain a matter of future research. A comparison of alternative approaches is beyond
the scope of this paper.
27A comparison of linear and interval regression estimates suggests that there are no qualitative differ-
ences in the results between the two approaches and that quantitative differences are rather small.
28Since our analysis samples are sufficiently large, we include the dependent variable in levels instead
of logs to facilitate the prediction of age-income profiles.
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2009). Specifically, we consider the influence function (IF) for a quantile qτ , which is
equal to (τ − 1{y ≤ qτ})/fy(qτ ), where fy(·) is the marginal density function of y. Given
an estimate of the recentered influence function RIF (y; qτ ) = qτ +IF (y; qτ ), we may write
the unconditional quantile regression model as
R̂IF (y; q̂τ ) = ατ + β1τexp+ β2τexp
2 + ν. (3)
Since unconditional quantile regression estimates capture the effect of the change in the
regressors on the quantile of the unconditional distribution of the dependent variable,
they can be used to predict age-income profiles at different quantiles of the distribution.
A distributional analysis is crucial in the context of student loans because repayment
burdens are typically most important for debtors with low incomes.
The predicted age-income profiles of the four groups are presented in Figure 3.29
Within each of these groups, we differentiate between 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles.
The underlying unconditional quantile regression estimates are presented in Table A1 of
the appendix.
The main broad features of the data are as follows. First, all figures show that pre-
dicted incomes increase over the life cycle at a decreasing rate and, for some, apparently
decrease in old age. Second, incomes are highest among male graduates in West Germany,
with annual incomes of this group increasing to almost e100,000 at the 75th percentile,
while annual incomes of West German female graduates and East German male graduates
only reach about e60,000 at the top of the distribution. Third, annual incomes of female
graduates in East Germany are always below e60,000 at the 75th percentile of the income
distribution.
< Figure 3 about here >
The profiles of the four groups also differ considerably at the median and the bottom
of the income distributions. In particular, we find that annual incomes of male gradu-
ates in West Germany increase to about e50,000 at the 25th percentile around the age
of 45-50 years. Moreover, while annual incomes of West German female graduates are
29The age-income profiles were adjusted by 1.5 percent per annum to capture productivity growth. A
growth rate of about 1.5 percent is in line with the usual indicators OECD (2008).
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at about e30,000 around the age of 45-50 years, annual incomes of male and female
graduates in East Germany remain below e30,000 at the 25th percentile.
In summary, while the predicted age-income profiles have the properties familiar to
exercises of these types, they also illustrate that there is substantial heterogeneity across
the four groups with respect to both the level and the spread of annual incomes. These
profiles constitute the starting point for the calculation of the loan repayment burdens
now considered.
5 Repayment Burden Results
What now follows considers the repayment burdens for the hypothetical loan scheme
described above, for West and East German graduates assumed to receive quite different
lifetime incomes. The results for the two repayment scenarios (10- and 15-year repayment
periods) are presented in Tables 3a and 3b.
The numbers in Table 3a reveal that university graduates with average income would
face repayment burdens of 9.3-14.4 percent in the first year of the repayment period,
which clearly exceeds the “8 percent rule” advocated by Baum and Schwartz (2006). As
anticipated, repayment burdens are much higher at the 25th percentile of the income
distribution, ranging from 14.4-20.9 percent at the beginning of the repayment period.
In contrast, repayment burdens of male university graduates in West Germany are
relatively low (6.9 percent in the first year of the repayment period) at the 75th percentile
of the income distribution, implying that many university graduates at the top of the
distribution could repay their student loans much faster without difficulties. At the same
time, repayment burdens of the remaining groups are still relatively high, even at the 75th
percentile (between 8.9 and 10.6 percent in the first year of the repayment period).30
The picture changes somewhat when we increase the repayment duration to 15 years
(Table 3b). Average repayment burdens drop to 5.4-9.1 percent in the first year of the
30Since repayment burdens are highest at the lower end of the distribution, we have also estimated
the age-income profiles at the 10th percentile. The estimates reveal very high repayment burdens at
the 10th percentile in the first year of the repayment period. Specifically, we obtain repayment burdens
of 26.9 percent for male and 23.6 percent for female graduates in West Germany and 27.3 percent for
male and 30.2 percent for female graduates in East Germany.
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repayment period and repayment burdens at the 75th percentile are always below 7 per-
cent. At the same time, repayment burdens at the 25th percentile remain very high
(between 9.3 and 16.9 percent in the first year of the repayment period).31
< Table 3a about here >
Although the repayment burdens presented in Tables 3a and 3b appear to be rather
moderate compared to the extreme burdens of up to 75 percent in Thailand and 60 percent
in the US, they are in fact substantial.32 To illustrate the impact of repayment burdens in
the German context, we may consider, for example, the group of female graduates in East
Germany at the 25th percentile. The predicted income in the first year of the repayment
period of this group is only about e11,900. The official poverty line in East Germany,
which is defined as 60 percent of the median equivalence income, was about e9,900 in 2008
(IW, 2011). Therefore, a repayment burden of 17 percent – as reported in Table 3b –
would put this group on the poverty line. Consequently, all female graduates in East
Germany below the 25th percentile would move below the official poverty line.33
< Table 3b about here >
A very important point for policy from the above repayment burden results is that
if a conventional student loan scheme is used to help German students finance higher
levels of tuition charges, there will be considerable adverse consequences for a significant
minority of those using the scheme. Many graduates will face difficulties, and some
very high repayment burdens would imply very high probabilities of defaulting on loans.
There would then be severe adverse consequences for both the credit reputations of the
individuals involved and with respect to taxpayer financed subsidies.
31Repayment burdens at the 10th percentile in the first year of the repayment period are 25.0 percent
for male and 18.4 percent for female graduates in West Germany and 23.1 percent for male and 23.4
percent for female graduates in East Germany.
32The difference in repayment burdens between Germany and the US is mainly attributable to the fact
that loans for living expenses are included in the calculation of repayment burdens in the US.
33For example, the predicted income in the first year of the repayment period at the 10th percentile
of this group is about e8,300, already well below the official poverty line. Subtracting the repayment
burden of about 23% at this percentile would move individuals in this group to about e6,400, which is
below 40% of the median equivalence income.
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6 An Income Contingent Loan for Germany?
The potential for there being significant problems with the use of a conventional student
loans system for future German tuition payment raises the possibility of the use of an
ICL. The conceptual differences between MLs and ICL have been considered above, with
the main point being that the maximum repayment burden of an ICL is set by legislation.
Thus the essential difference between loan policies is that because repayments of an ICL
are defined by capacity to pay and mortgage-type repayments depend on time, the former
implicitly offers insurance against repayment hardships and are thus presumed to minimize
defaults due to hardship.
For the policy debate it is useful to speculate on what an ICL for Germany might
look like and what sort of repayment paths might result. To this end we have designed
a hypothetical and very simple ICL for Germany, in which repayment obligations are
assumed to be 8 percent of a debtor’s total annual gross income.34 Assuming the same level
of debt as for the repayment burden exercises reported above, it is possible to calculate
the time periods associated with repayment for the various income groups defined by both
demography and expected lifetime incomes. These are shown in Table 4, and presented
diagrammatically in the appendix.
< Table 4 about here >
The main results of Table 4 are: (1) for those receiving average graduate incomes
the length of time of a simple ICL are between 7 and 11 years; (2) the time taken to
repay for those in the top 25 percent of graduate incomes is a low 5-8 years; and (3) the
lowest income recipients in these exercises will take 10-19 years to repay. These results
are roughly comparable to the Australian experience for similar levels of debt (Chapman,
2006). They imply that it would seem to be straightforward to design an ICL for Germany
that would result in a range of repayment experiences consistent with those already being
experienced in those countries with apparently successful ICL arrangements.
34The assumed ICL can be compared to those in operation in Australia, in which there is a threshold
of income below which no repayments are required, after which given progressive proportions of income
are required for repayment and these range from 4 to 8 percent. In the English and New Zealand schemes
there are also thresholds for repayment with the basis being a set proportion of additional income above
this level (Chapman, 2006).
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7 Conclusion
Despite recent withdrawals from tuition fees in several German states, it is very likely that
the political and economic circumstances of Germany will lead to significant increases in
higher education tuition charges in the future. For reasons that are well understood in the
economics literature, this possibility highlights the need for an important expansion in
the availability and sizes of student loans. Two possibilities currently used internationally
are mortgage-type and income contingent loans.
Against this background, and through reference to the conceptual differences between
these approaches to student loans, this paper explores empirically some of the important
consequences of different loan schemes. Our method involved analyses of data from the
German Microcensus 2008 from which we are able to derive a large range of expected
future income streams using linear and unconditional quantile regression models. We
differentiate between men and women residing in East and West Germany and calculate
separate repayment burdens for university graduates in each of these groups.
With the use of the income profiles our major contribution is to illustrate that, with
the likely level of debts, a significant issue emerges with respect to expected repayment
burdens (the proportion of a graduate’s income required to repay the loan). This is
that for many graduates the burdens will be at levels considered in the literature to be
excessive, and for those with quite low incomes these burdens will be extremely high. For
many debtors under such a scheme the prospects of both consumption hardship and loan
defaults are large.
ICLs do not allow high repayment burdens and this is their most important feature.
We have modeled a very simple ICL for Germany, and with the use of the income profiles
obtained from the earlier exercise we illustrate the time periods associated with this type
of loan repayment. The results suggest that an ICL would deliver experiences similar to
those of other countries using such an approach to student financing.
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Figure A1: Annual Income Contingent Loan Repayment
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Table 1: Tuition Fees and Public Loans
Tuition Nominal Maximum Minimum
State Fees p.a. Bank Interest Debt Net Income
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg e1,000 L-Bank 3.78% e15,000 e1,060
(until summer 2012) (max. 5.5%)
Bavaria e1,000 KfW 2.69% e15,000 e1,060
Fo¨rderbank (max. 7.75%)
Hamburg (until e750 KfW 2.87% e17,000 e1,060
summer 2008) Fo¨rderbank (max. 7.5%)
Hesse (until e1,000 Landes- 6.16% / 0% e15,000 e1,260
summer 2008) treuhandstelle (max. 7.5%)
Lower Saxony e1,000 KfW 3.06% e15,000 e1,060
Fo¨rderbank (max. 7.5%)
North-Rhine Westfalia e1,000 NRW.Bank 3.896% e10,000 e1,040
(until summer 2011) (max. 5.90%)
Saarland (until e1,000 KfW 0% <2.85% e15,000 e1,060
winter 2009/2010) Fo¨rderbank (-)
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Sample of University Graduates
Men Women
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
West Germany
Annual gross income 49,804 35,005 28,167 18,020
Annual net income 36,619 20,960 22,786 12,262
Employed 0.897 0.303 0.864 0.343
Age 44.8 10.8 42.6 10.9
Potential labour market experience 16.3 11.3 15.2 11.7
Number of observations 6,634 6,293
East Germany
Annual gross income 33,094 25,328 25,147 16,595
Annual net income 26,013 15,741 20,763 10,919
Employed 0.829 0.376 0.825 0.380
Age 46.7 11.4 44.7 10.9
Potential labour market experience 19.0 12.0 18.1 12.0
Number of observations 1,946 2,052
Note: Weighted numbers based on weights provided by the Microcensus.
Table 3a: Repayment Burdens of Conventional Loan Repayment Scheme (Percent)
West Germany East Germany
Mean Q25 Q50 Q75 Mean Q25 Q50 Q75
Men
Year 1 9.34 14.49 10.03 6.98 11.52 16.77 11.19 9.35
Year 2 8.51 12.91 9.07 6.39 10.61 15.34 10.40 8.58
Year 3 7.79 11.61 8.25 5.89 9.82 14.11 9.70 7.92
Year 4 7.17 10.53 7.56 5.45 9.13 13.06 9.08 7.34
Year 5 6.63 9.61 6.96 5.06 8.52 12.14 8.53 6.83
Year 6 6.16 8.83 6.44 4.72 7.98 11.34 8.03 6.38
Year 7 5.74 8.16 5.99 4.42 7.50 10.64 7.59 5.98
Year 8 5.37 7.57 5.58 4.14 7.07 10.02 7.19 5.62
Year 9 5.04 7.05 5.22 3.90 6.69 9.47 6.82 5.30
Year 10 3.39 4.72 3.51 2.63 4.53 6.42 4.64 3.59
Average 6.51 9.55 6.86 4.96 8.34 11.93 8.32 6.69
Women
Year 1 12.50 18.86 11.83 8.99 14.43 20.95 14.81 10.66
Year 2 11.82 17.84 11.21 8.52 13.44 19.31 13.66 9.95
Year 3 11.20 16.88 10.64 8.09 12.56 17.89 12.65 9.31
Year 4 10.62 16.00 10.11 7.68 11.77 16.63 11.76 8.73
Year 5 10.09 15.18 9.62 7.30 11.06 15.53 10.97 8.21
Year 6 9.59 14.42 9.16 6.94 10.42 14.54 10.28 7.74
Year 7 9.12 13.71 8.72 6.61 9.84 13.66 9.65 7.32
Year 8 8.69 13.05 8.32 6.30 9.31 12.87 9.09 6.93
Year 9 8.28 12.43 7.94 6.01 8.82 12.16 8.59 6.58
Year 10 5.65 8.48 5.42 4.11 5.99 8.23 5.82 4.47
Average 9.76 14.69 9.30 7.06 10.77 15.18 10.73 7.99
Table 3b: Repayment Burdens of Conventional Loan Repayment Scheme (Percent)
West Germany East Germany
Mean Q25 Q50 Q75 Mean Q25 Q50 Q75
Men
Year 1 5.44 9.30 6.51 4.03 6.95 13.37 7.71 5.52
Year 2 4.86 8.24 5.68 3.70 6.33 11.95 7.10 5.12
Year 3 4.38 7.38 5.04 3.41 5.80 10.79 6.58 4.76
Year 4 3.99 6.68 4.51 3.16 5.35 9.83 6.13 4.45
Year 5 3.65 6.08 4.08 2.94 4.96 9.02 5.73 4.17
Year 6 3.36 5.58 3.72 2.74 4.62 8.34 5.37 3.92
Year 7 3.11 5.15 3.42 2.57 4.33 7.75 5.06 3.70
Year 8 2.90 4.78 3.16 2.41 4.06 7.24 4.78 3.50
Year 9 2.71 4.46 2.93 2.28 3.83 6.80 4.53 3.32
Year 10 2.54 4.17 2.74 2.15 3.62 6.41 4.30 3.15
Year 11 2.39 3.92 2.57 2.04 3.44 6.07 4.10 3.00
Year 12 2.26 3.70 2.42 1.94 3.27 5.77 3.91 2.87
Year 13 2.14 3.50 2.28 1.85 3.12 5.51 3.75 2.74
Year 14 2.03 3.32 2.17 1.76 2.99 5.27 3.60 2.63
Year 15 0.17 0.27 0.18 0.14 0.25 0.44 0.30 0.22
Average 3.50 5.74 3.88 2.81 4.75 8.43 5.42 3.98
Women
Year 1 7.77 13.21 7.64 5.52 9.15 16.97 9.92 6.63
Year 2 7.30 12.43 7.19 5.17 8.45 15.38 9.03 6.09
Year 3 6.87 11.71 6.77 4.85 7.84 14.03 8.28 5.63
Year 4 6.48 11.06 6.40 4.56 7.31 12.89 7.63 5.23
Year 5 6.12 10.45 6.05 4.30 6.83 11.90 7.07 4.87
Year 6 5.79 9.90 5.74 4.07 6.41 11.04 6.58 4.56
Year 7 5.49 9.39 5.45 3.85 6.03 10.29 6.15 4.28
Year 8 5.21 8.92 5.18 3.65 5.68 9.62 5.77 4.03
Year 9 4.95 8.48 4.93 3.47 5.38 9.03 5.44 3.81
Year 10 4.72 8.08 4.70 3.30 5.10 8.51 5.13 3.61
Year 11 4.50 7.70 4.49 3.15 4.84 8.04 4.87 3.43
Year 12 4.29 7.35 4.30 3.00 4.61 7.62 4.62 3.27
Year 13 4.11 7.02 4.12 2.87 4.40 7.24 4.41 3.12
Year 14 3.93 6.72 3.95 2.75 4.21 6.90 4.21 2.99
Year 15 0.32 0.55 0.33 0.23 0.35 0.57 0.35 0.25
Average 5.84 9.84 5.77 4.12 6.49 11.01 6.68 4.65
Table 4: Repayment Duration (in years)
West Germany East Germany
Men Women Men Women
Mean 7 10 9 11
Q25 10 17 14 19
Q50 7 10 10 12
Q75 5 7 7 8
Table A1.–Unconditional Quantile Regression Results
West East
Men Women Men Women
Q25
Potential labour market experience 1706.91*** 324.76*** 1044.53*** 681.02***
(67.88) (58.95) (105.85) (75.89)
Potential labour market experience2/100 -3611.93*** -549.81*** -2908.71*** -1607.45***
(173.19) (149.93) (266.83) (197.33)
Constant 12453.94*** 12327.24*** 12033.82*** 10035.65***
(572.29) (454.54) (914.98) (641.41)
R2 0.132 0.012 0.073 0.050
Q50
Potential labour market experience 1995.13*** 450.85*** 1088.60*** 966.28***
(64.30) (51.12) (90.15) (71.85)
Potential labour market experience2/100 -4139.78*** -797.53*** -2942.06*** -2279.23***
(179.29) (135.42) (226.40) (186.94)
Constant 19315.32*** 19859.45*** 19341.95*** 14182.98***
(463.38) (378.99) (765.12) (586.25)
R2 0.151 0.025 0.082 0.084
Q75
Potential labour market experience 2286.46*** 609.73*** 1695.84*** 1000.13***
(87.13) (53.13) (143.08) (82.82)
Potential labour market experience2/100 -4966.77*** -1058.80*** -4093.76*** -2363.98***
(250.42) (147.78) (385.10) (224.78)
Constant 29412.23*** 26064.49*** 22007.1*** 20655.92***
(484.24) (352.12) (941.67) (558.19)
R2 0.090 0.037 0.051 0.058
N 6,634 6,293 1,946 2,052
Note.–Weighted regressions based on weights provided by the Microcensus. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
